Seven weeks from today, the most consequential incentive in U.S. semiconductor policy closes to new entrants. The 35% investment tax credit for capital expenses associated with the production of semiconductors is available only to projects that begin fab construction before December 31, 2026. Under Treasury rules, a project that begins construction in 2026 can be placed in service up to 10 years later and still claim the credit. That eligibility window is now a matter of weeks, not months. At least 28 publicly traded companies say they have claimed, or expect to claim, the CHIPS Act tax credit, and together they have reported at least $14.7 billion in CHIPS Act credits, according to a review of SEC filings from August 2022 through November 2026.1
The subsidy math behind the largest projects illustrates what is at stake. Following the enactment of the CHIPS Act, one major U.S. memory manufacturer announced plans to invest in leading-edge manufacturing sites in Idaho and New York, based on CHIPS Act support through grants and investment tax credits. That firm secured up to $6.1 billion in direct funding from the Department of Commerce for planned fabs in Boise, Idaho, and Clay, New York, with subsequent amendments to the agreements adding a second Idaho fab and reallocating funding accordingly. The One Big Beautiful Bill Act increased the investment tax credit from 25% to 35% on qualified investments. On a $27 billion capital expenditure program, the difference between a 25% and 35% credit is not marginal: the 35% credit on a $5 billion fab represents $1.75 billion in federal value alone, before the direct grant is counted. That arithmetic is what induced the construction-start rush now visible across the industry.2
What the Subsidy Structure Actually Does (and Doesn't Do)
The CHIPS Act incentive architecture was designed to shift the return profile of domestic fab construction enough to make projects economically viable that otherwise would not clear corporate hurdle rates. It did that. The Section 48D credit has helped catalyze more than $540 billion in announced U.S. semiconductor supply chain investment across more than 100 projects in 28 states.3 But the structure also reveals a clear boundary: public subsidy covers the fixed infrastructure layer, the multi-decade fab campuses that no private investor would or could finance at the required scale on the required timeline.
What it does not cover, and was never designed to cover, is the broader ecosystem that those fabs require: specialized equipment suppliers, advanced packaging intermediaries, materials processors, design and verification tooling, and talent pipelines. Semiconductor supply chain investments have spread through more than 100 projects across 28 U.S. states, including 17 new fabs and eight new supply chain and advanced packaging facilities.4 The supply chain layer is where private capital is already moving, and where the structural rationale for that movement sharpens after December 31.
The Transition That Begins January 1
Fiscal year 2026 is the final year for which the Department of Commerce is to receive CHIPS Act funding for incentivizing the domestic production of semiconductors.5 That is not a cliff for projects already underway. In July 2026, one major awardee achieved the first concrete pour for the foundation of its first New York fab, marking the transition from site preparation into vertical construction. Those projects carry forward under existing agreements regardless of what happens to the incentive program after year-end.
What changes is the entry condition. Projects that have not broken ground by December 31 do not qualify for the 35% credit, and Congress may consider whether to extend additional financial support, including via extending the 35% investment tax credit beyond December 31, 2026. No extension has been enacted as of this writing. Industry groups want the credit extended, possibly as part of a year-end tax package, with Senate Finance Committee Chair Mike Crapo and Ranking Member Ron Wyden releasing a joint statement in support of that extension.1 Whether that happens changes the calculus for projects still in permitting. It does not change the calculus for the supply chain.
The supply chain opportunity is durable independent of subsidy policy, for a simple reason: the majority of new fabs will not reach volume production until 2028 to 2030, while semiconductor lead times have reached 40 weeks as of March 2026 and mature-node capacity remains structurally constrained.6 A fab campus that breaks ground today and pours concrete does not produce a wafer for three to four years. Everything that feeds that production ramp, from ultrapure materials to lithography equipment servicing to advanced packaging capacity, is in demand now and will intensify as fabs come online.
The Layer Where Private Capital Has Pricing Power
The public subsidy covers the infrastructure that private capital cannot price: the multi-decade, geopolitically motivated commitment to anchor domestic leading-edge capacity. It does not, and structurally cannot, cover every node in the value chain that depends on that anchor. For the supply chain, some of the capacity additions that OEMs are counting on in their 2028 to 2030 planning models may not materialize on the timelines currently projected if the intermediate supply chain fails to scale in parallel.6 That gap is where pricing power exists for private investors: constrained capacity serving a demand pull that is already contracted and government-backed.
Fiscal year 2026 is the final year for which Commerce receives CHIPS Act incentive funding, and the construction deadline is already sorting projects into those that will qualify and those that will not.7 The sorting is real, but it does not close the investment thesis; it concentrates it. The public infrastructure is being built. The question for capital allocators is which part of the supply chain that infrastructure feeds remains underserved, and what the entry window for that capacity actually looks like before the production ramp arrives.
Footnotes
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Micron Technology, Inc., Form 10-K, Fiscal Year Ending September 3, 2026, filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission ↩
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teeptrak.com, "CHIPS Act Section 48D in 2026: How US Manufacturers Lock In the 35% Credit Before It's Gone," 2026 ↩
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Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, "U.S. Semiconductor Manufacturing Tax Credits Need To Be Extended and Broadened," June 10, 2025 ↩
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Congressional Research Service, "Semiconductor Fabrication Facilities Funded by the CHIPS Act: Project Status and Considerations for Congress," July 2026 ↩
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accuristech.com, "The CHIPS Act and Semiconductor Reshoring: What It Means for Component Availability," 2026 ↩ ↩2
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siliconanalysts.com, "The Efficiency Tax: How CHIPS Act Subsidy Allocation, Geopolitical Risk, and Competing Fab Strategies Are Reshaping the US Domestic Semiconductor Supply Chain," October 2026 ↩